Abstract: Cloud computing is a promising computing paradigm for trading computing resources over internet. We consider the approach where the cloud provider (CP) rents free processors for its clients. Maximising reward is the key objective for the CP. The optimisation problem of renting processors on the cloud is a complex and challenging task. In addition to consider the requirements of the CP and clients, the commercialisation of clouds requires policies that take into account the economic concerns for the CP and clients. Within this context, we propose an optimal auction based on the concept of virtual valuation for renting processors. The concept of virtual valuation is used in our auction mechanism. Numerical analysis stresses the ability of our approach to maximise the CP's reward under varying cloud environment conditions.
Introduction
Cloud computing is a promising technology that improves IT services where computing resources are made available to clients over internet. Thus, CP must utilise its resources efficiently to maximise its reward. CP may trade anything from infrastructure such as processors, memory, and internet access, …, etc (Chee and Franklin, 2009; Sosinsky, 2011; Buckley, 2010) . In our work, CP rents free processors for executing clients' requests. The cost of renting processors is amortised through client payments. The set of processors in the cloud environment are managed by the CP. Clearly, the reward of the CP is the key driving force behind the realisation of the cloud computing. With this assumption of economically rational users, the CP is interested in renting his processors for clients only if he can generate extra reward from this action. In this paper, we present a framework in which these clients could tap into unused processors anywhere in the world, while the CP can generate additional reward in this market. One of the key features of this market is that the renting contracts cover the whole world. We use auction for pricing and selecting the clients in the cloud environment. There are a number of desired properties for auction mechanism. These properties include:
• truthfulness
• high reward for the CPs and high computing resource utilisation for the system as a whole.
Our work focuses on reward generation of truthful auctions where each client is interested in renting certain number of processors. The proposed auction model realises continuous gain optimisation for the CP. We assume the clients' valuation distributions are known to the CP. In order to enforce truthfulness and to maximise the expected reward the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism (Vickrey, 1961 ) is used to design the optimal auction model. The concept of virtual valuation is used for the auction instead of original value for the client. Virtual valuation is a function of valuation distribution. It is widely used in conventional economical analysis. It can be shown that reward maximisation is equivalent to maximising the clients' virtual values. An optimal renting rule therefore rents processors to the clients with the highest non-negative virtual values. The main contributions of our work are as follows:
1 We investigate the reward maximisation problem for CPs in the cloud environment.
We propose using the VCG auction to maximise the expected reward by maximising the associated virtual valuation for the clients under the Bayesian setting.
2 Clients' satisfaction by providing the committed number of the processors to guarantee the quality of service (QoS) for clients. This objective is achieved by offering adequate number of processors for serving users requests. CP serves new requests on the basis of auction policy that ensures request effective processors availability.
3 How VCG methodology can be used to obtain a computationally feasible solution to the considered processors renting problem is described in the cloud environment.
4 The performance of the processors renting model is evaluated under different system parameters.
The success of the proposed auction framework depends on the optimisation of both objectives: client's satisfaction, and CP's reward. However, these objectives conflict with each other. While each client attempts to minimise the total payment of renting, the CP wishes to his reward by selecting the highest bids. The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the cloud environment and auction model. Related works are reviewed in Section 3. The auction mechanism is presented in Section 4. Section 5 presents the performance evaluation results. Finally the paper is concluded and future research directions are given.
Cloud environment and auction model
In this section, we present our auction model. Our design objectives include:
• Processors utilisation efficiency.
• Flexible service requests.
• Maximising CP's reward. However, some of these objectives are correlated and they cannot be achieved at the same time.
Clients access CP's processors using networked client devices, such as desktop computers, laptops, and smartphones. Clients rely on CP's for a majority of their applications. Requests are sent using web browser to interact with the CP. The winner client gets a virtual machine running on servers with the selected operating system running on top of virtualisation software. Figure 1 depicts the architecture of a cloud computing environment. In the cloud environment, many CPs are private companies driven by the profit. Their processors are rented through traditional auctions. The main concern of CPs is maximising their own profits. Cloud environment consists of a CP and X clients. The CP has K processors that are offered to the clients. All processors have the same capacity. Each client sends its bid B i = (d i , b i , t i ) where d i indicating the requested number of processors, b i is the bidding price for the requested number of processors and t i is the rental period. Clearly, the price charged for winning client must be no greater than its bidding price.
We assume that client's requests arrival follows Poisson distribution and the client has arrival rate λ. The service time μ for each request and it is assumed to be exponentially distributed. The CP faces the challenge of deciding which requests are admitted. To decide the accepted requests, the CP should consider users demand for service and the bids. Users demand is closely related to the reward received from clients.
The winner client gets the requested number of processors while the loser does not get anything. The CP desires the truthful bids from the clients. We assume that these parameters are changed over time corresponding to the system conditions, such as work load, and processors demand. The true value of the requested processors d i is indicated by ν i . The true value is private information for the client. ν i is drawn from the distribution F i .
Each client has no knowledge of each other's truth valuation.
After receiving all requests for processors, the CP specifies the winner and the charging price. The set of winners is represented by vector w = (w 1 , w 2 , w 3 ,…, w n ).The charging prices are indicated by the vector p = (p 1 , p 2 , p 3 ,…, p n ), where w i indicates the number of processors allocated for client i and p i is the processor price. The utility function for i th client is computed as follows:
The winner client has exclusive right to use the processors for executing his jobs. Assume A i is the maximum amount that the client can bid (i.e., client budget). The reward for the CP is computed as follows:
Then, auction problem for the CP can be formulated as follows:
The first constraint states that a given processor can only be allocated to at most one client. The second constraint is the budget constraint. It is the limit on the consumption that a consumer can afford. 
The expected reward for the CP is given by:
where P is the probability of conducting the auction. We use
to represent the vector of bidding prices without i th client bid, and also similar for w -i .
Optimising the expected reward
In our model, Bayesian mechanism is used for optimising the expected reward. We assume the valuations of clients are drawn from a distribution which is known for the CP.
Myerson mechanism (Myerson, 1981) is a truthful mechanism which is used for maximising the expected reward based on the virtual valuation. Virtual valuation is computed as follows (Myerson, 1981) :
where f i is computed as follows (Myerson, 1981) :
We assume F i satisfy the monotone hazard rate assumption. With this assumption, δ i (ν i ) (virtual valuation function) is a monotone non-decreasing function. The auction mechanism associates the clients who offer high reservation price with high valuation distribution and the clients with low reservation price is associated with low valuation distribution.
The reward maximisation problem can be solved using the well known VCG mechanism where the winner is selected based on maximising the sum of winning bids (payment from each client). The detailed auction is as follows:
1 for the given bid B i and F i do 2 compute the virtual bid
Select the winners using VCG mechanism 5 Assign processors as follows:
where L is a set of losers. The auction is truthful if the allocation algorithm is monotone and the price charged is critical value (Nisan, 2007) . According to our auction algorithm, if i th client wins by bidding b i , then it also wins by bidding b i + Δ where Δ > 0. 
is non-decreasing.
Proof:
The main concern of the auction scheme is to select the winner vector w that maximises the sum of virtual valuation S ν as follows:
Suppose i th client increases his bidding price by Δ where Δ > 0, while other clients do not change their prices b -i . Because of the assumption of monotone hazard rate, clearly the virtual valuation for δ i (b i + Δ) is greater than δ i (b i ). Therefore, winner selection scheme selects b i to maximise the sum valuation S ν According to auction algorithm 1, the virtual payment for i th client ( ) i p′ does not depend on the bidding price (b i ), which mean the virtual payment is the critical value.
Lemma 1: For the i th winner, the virtual payment i p′ is a critical value.
In the cloud environment, each client tries to win the auction by bidding its truthful valuation. For example, if i th client loses the auction, then its utility u i (b i ) = 0. However, if the client bids ν i , the utility of i th client will be:
On the other hand, if i th client wins by bidding ν i , the utilities are the same for ν i and b i because the payment is the same and the utility for both cases is computed as follows:
If the i th client loses by bidding ν i , then according to the monotonic assumption the truthful valuation ν i should be less than the price b i . Bidding the price b i gives negative utility for the client. Therefore, bidding the truth valuation gives the highest utility for the client. Our scheme tries to maximise the expected utility for the client in the cloud environment. The expected utility for i th client is computed as follows:
where P(b i ) is the probability the i th client wins the auction by bidding b i . P(b i ) is increasing function of b i since higher bids increases the likelihood of winning the auction. However, higher bids decrease the utility of the client significantly. CP requires the winners to pay more than the actual costs of renting the spectrum. For i th client, the cost of renting processors is:
For a truthful mechanism, the expected payment of i th client should satisfy (Nisan, 2007) :
Auction without VCG-mechanism
The VCG-based auction is NP-hard problem (Nisan and Ronen, 2007) . The VCG-based auction is able to generate the maximum gain. However, the computational complexity is high and this prevents using the VCG-based auction in the large-scale cloud environment. For a certain class of maximisation problems, VCG-based mechanism can be applied by imposing additional restriction on the problem size (Lehmann et al., 2002) . We use the non-VCG auction that proposed in Lehmann et al. (2002) that consists of:
• receiving the bids from all clients and rank them
• selecting the highest bids and renting them the processors
• calculating the total payment for each client.
The non-VCG auction mechanism can be summarised as follows:
Remove(L, i)

end while
It is known that, the processors are rented to the high bidder. The bidder should pay his true value regardless of what he believes about other bidders. Assume z is the highest bid made by another client. The probability density function for bid submission is computed as follows:
where b max is the maximum bid of all the bids submitted by the bidders and b min is the minimum bid submitted for the CP. The i th client will win if and only if all the (n-k-1) bidders' bids are less than b i . The probability that any bid b j < b i , such that, i ≠ j; j, i ∈ (n -k) bidders can be given:
Substituting P b and integrating, we obtain,
where n is the total number of bidders.
Related work
Auction is used as a mechanism for resource allocation in cloud computing. In Parsons et al. (2011) , a tutorial introduction of using auction for computer science is presented. Myerson (1981) develops an auction mechanism for a single auction commodity scenario. Zaman and Grosu (2010) propose two auctions schemes to allocate virtual machines (VMs) to users. They argue that combinatorial auction-based allocation mechanisms are efficient for fixed-price mechanisms since the VMs instances are assigned to users having the highest valuation. The problem of VM allocation in clouds is formulated as a combinatorial auction problem. The VM allocation problem is investigated in Zhang et al. (2011) for spot markets by solving a static optimisation problem. The authors design truthful (dominant strategy) mechanisms for several combinatorial problems where each agent's secret data is naturally expressed by a single positive real number. In Danak and Mannor (2010) , two resource-allocation mechanisms for on-demand computing services are presented. Each user pays for his actual usage of the computational resources. The seller adjusts his resources to maximise his profit from trading. In Wang et al. (2012) , the problem of cloud resource pricing is formulated and investigated. The authors propose a suite of computationally efficient and truthful auction-style pricing mechanisms. The proposed scheme enables users to fairly compete for resources and it enables the CPs to increase their overall revenue.
The problem of scheduling tasks on parallel identical machines is investigated in Angel et al. (2006) . The main goal of the proposed scheme is to minimise the makespan (i.e., the date at which the last job finishes its execution). Each client submits its bid and the CP allocates machines for these jobs based on the bids. In Buyya et al. (2002) , a new computational economy framework is proposed to address complex resource management issues in cloud environment. The proposed framework provides mechanisms for optimising resource provider and client objective functions through trading and brokering services. The authors discuss the use of different pricing models for interaction between CPs to decide resource service value, and the necessary infrastructure to realise each model. In Sood (2013) , a value based prediction model is proposed for resource provisioning. CP uses the proposed scheme for dynamically allocating and releasing VMs based on the resource usage rate. The CP uses sliding window to analyse the resource usage rate and to predict the system behaviour in advance. A lot of processing time can be saved by predicting the resource requirements in advance.
Game theory is used in Wei et al. (2010) to solve the problem of resource allocation in cloud environment. Each client in the cloud environment solves its optimal problem independently, without consideration of the multiplexing of resource assignments. A binary integer programming method is used to solve the independent optimisation. A new mechanism is proposed to change multiplexed strategies of the initial optimal solutions of different participants with minimising their efficiency losses. The authors demonstrate that the Nash equilibrium always exists if the game has feasible solutions. In Deng et al. (2012) , the authors study double auction in the cloud computing environment where the CP wants to maximise his total revenue by buying low from the sellers and selling high to the buyers. A Bayesian setting is considered where buyers and sellers have independent probability distributions on the values of products in the cloud environment. Each seller has one kind of item that can be sold in whole to a buyer, and each buyer's value is represented by a single parameter. A new truthful mechanism is proposed for the CP to achieve the maximum revenue. The authors propose a cloud market framework for people to build a uniform and fully competitive cloud market in Shang et al. (2010) . Each client can buy resources from different CPs and exchange their idle resources in a more flexible way. Double auction Bayesian game-based pricing model (DABGPM) is proposed for the suggested cloud market and the authors investigate how to develop an optimal pricing strategy for this model. A market-driven continuous double auction method (MCDA) is proposed in Farajian and Zamanifar (2013) for efficient cloud service allocation. The proposed scheme enables clients to order various resources as a workflow for utilising the requested services. For the suggested method, clients and CPs make bids and requests based on market rivalry, time, opportunity, and eagerness factor. However, most of the cloud approaches do not attempt to support a variety of design requirements that include:
1 the dynamic nature of the cloud environment where supply-demand relations are fluctuated over time 2 truthful designs to prevent the bidders from cheating.
Performance evaluation
In this section, the performance of the proposed auction scheme is evaluated. The proposed scheme is implemented in the C language. Requests are served based on the gained reward. The uniform distribution is used to generate the number of the requested processors for each request. Each client's valuation follows the uniform distribution F(z) = z in the range (0, 1). The key performance measures of interest in the simulations are: CP's reward and utility for clients. Each simulation run consists of 100,000 requests. The results are averaged over enough independent runs so that the confidence level is 95% and the relative errors do not exceed 5%. We examine the performance under different parameter settings.
Reward as a function of system capacity and service demand
In this section we compare the performance of the auction with VCG (VCG auction), auction without VCG (suboptimal auction), and traditional auction. Traditional auction scheme does not consider the valuation distribution but it uses valuation instead of virtual valuation. System capacity refers to the numbers of processors that CP can offer to the clients. Figure 2 shows the net gain for the CP with number of offered processors Op = 50, Op = 60, Op = 70, Op = 80, Op = 90 and Op = 100. The results show that the VCG auction and suboptimal auction scheme outperform the traditional auction in term of reward. The reported reward for the traditional scheme decreases after certain number of the offered processors. For the traditional scheme, the number of losers decreases when the CP offers more processors but the payments from winners decrease significantly. The reported reward for the VCG auction and suboptimal auction increases as the supply increases due to the reservation price effect. However, after certain number of the offered processors the reward becomes stable and the increment in the number of processors does not affect the reward due to the limited number of clients. Hence, CP reaches the maximum reward. Figure 3 displays the reported reward for different service demand. For the VCG auction, and suboptimal auction, the figure shows that the reward is increased for higher demand of service (arrival rate) and for the system with higher capacity. CP can serve more clients when it has more processors for serving clients. These results stress the ability of these schemes to maximise CP's reward for different service demand ties. However, for the traditional auction the reward decreases because the payments from the winners decrease. 
Impact of demand on the utility for the clients
In this section, we study the impact of the demand for service on the clients' utility. The arrival rate for clients' requests vary over time from λ = 2 (low demand) to Op λ = 8 (high demand). Figure 4 depicts that, as the demand for processors increases, the client utility decreases due to the competition among clients. For high demand, the likelihood of offering lower price and find a CP who accepts to rent its processors with this price becomes lower. However, the clients cannot keep increasing the prices forever because of the budget constraint. If the CP increases the offered number of the processors, the likelihood of finding processors with cheapest prices increases. In the other hand, if the CP offers less number of the processors, the competition among clients is increased and they forced to increase the bidding price to get acceptance for their requests. Hence, the utility for SUs is degraded significantly. Figure 5 shows the winning price for different arrival rates of processors requests. Clearly, the clients are enforced to increase the price for high demand because of competition with other clients. However, clients have more freedom to offer less prices for processors when the demand for spectrum decreases. Clearly, if the clients have extra cash they will bid more for winning. Figure 6 shows the winning price for different values of clients' budget. It can be observed that in any period when the client has more cash, the winning price is increased significantly. For high cash, the likelihood of offering high price and find a CP who accepts to rent its processors with this price becomes high.
However, the clients cannot keep increasing the prices forever because of the budget constraint. Figure 7 shows the CP's reward for different client's budgets. It is clear as the budget increases the reward is increased significantly. Large values of the budget promote the client to increase the bids. Large values of the budget model the clients who are wealthy and they concern more for the service instead of the satisfaction level they may get from the product (processors).
When applying VCG mechanisms to complex mechanism design problems such as processors renting in large-scale cloud environment (i.e., large number of clients), a problem emerges even finding an optimal solution is computationally intractable. VCG auction is no longer applicable for large-scale cloud environment in term of execution time.
Although increasing the number of clients improves the CP's reward, the execution time of VCG auction increased significantly. We evaluate the scalability of our auction scheme for a large-scale cloud environment. We compare the performance of VCG auction with the suboptimal auction. The execution time comparison of the two schemes is shown in Figure 8 . The figure shows that the execution time increases as the arrival rates increase for both schemes but for the suboptimal auction scheme the reported execution time is less than VCG auction. The results emphasis that suboptimal auction is suit for large-scale cloud environment in time efficiency and economic considerations. However, the performance of VCG auction is getting worse for large-scale cloud environment. 
Conclusions and future work
In this paper, we presented a general cloud computing trading framework, and in particular, an auction framework, for future CPs and clients. The CP can rent free processors using this framework. We motivated this framework and present some of the design principles. How to maximise auction reward while enforcing truthful bidding, and how to maximise the clients' utility are two key challenges we addressed in this work. The optimal strategy of the CP is obtained under conditions where the service demand of clients is "uncertain.
The proposed model has two contributions to trading the computing resources in the cloud environment. From the application side, the main contribution is developing a control policy that considers different requirements such as reward for CP, the dynamic nature of the cloud environment, and the utility for the clients. All basic functions are integrated and optimised into one homogenous, theoretically-based model. From the modelling side, we formulate a trading of free resources problem as a reward maximisation problem. Such a formulation allows auction scheme to optimise the trading problem. The approach presents a general framework for studying, analysing, and optimising other resource trading in the cloud computing environment. The future work includes extension of the auction model and considering the competition among CPs in the cloud environment.
